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Workfare: A Marginal Employment Subsidy for 
Public and Private Sectors. (2nd edition). 
R.S.Musgrave. 
 
 
This paper is roughly 18,000 words long. There is an abbreviated version roughly 
2,500 words at a blog:   http://employerlastresort.blogspot.com/2009/03/employer-of-
last-resort.html  
The first edition of this paper (1991) was the basis of a paper written in 2004 and put 
online by Roskilde University:  
http://www.ruc.dk/upload/application/pdf/570263ca/ralph%20musgrave.pdf   And 
these two papers were the basis of a chapter (by the same author) in “The Future of 
the Welfare State”, 2006, edited by Bent Greve, published by Ashgate. The central 
points made in the latter three works are the same.  
 
Introduction to 2nd Edition.    
This 2nd edition is very similar to the 1st edition, except for the four changes set out 
below. In particular the main text does NOT reflect labour market research between 
publication of the 1st edition (1991) and the above 2004 paper or between 1991 and 
the date of publication of this 2nd edition. Readers who want to see the ideas in this 
paper presented in a way to reflects this more recent research should read the 
above 2004 paper or the above mentioned chapter in “The Future of the Welfare 
State”. However, the research that appeared in the decade or so after 1991 did not 
seem to detracted from the basic points made in these papers: indeed much of this 
research supported the ideas advocated here. Thus readers will miss none of the 
basic ideas by reading the pages below. 
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Differences between 1st and 2nd edition. 
1. The contents of the 3rd appendix is different. The original 3rd appendix was on the 
fallacies of labour supply reduction schemes (e.g. early retirement) as a cure for 
unemployment. This was not very relevant to the central points in this paper. This 
has been replaced with a few hundred words setting out the flaws in what are called 
“traditional marginal employment subsidies”, i.e. rewarding each employer in 
proportion to the expansion in the numbers they employ compared to some starting 
date.  
2. A fourth appendix has been added. This is on “fiat money / Chartalist” ideas on 
workfare. The relevance of this is that Chartalists  claim that Chartalism facilitates a 
big rise in government deficit, which Chartalists think should be spent on workfare or 
“employer of last resort” schemes.   
3. The summary has been lengthened a bit.  
4. The rest of the paper is identical to the first edition except that about three spelling 
mistakes have been corrected and there are fewer words per page. Obviously the 
contents page has been altered to reflect this.  
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Worswick for criticisms of an earlier draft of this work. The views expressed below are however those 
of the author alone. The arguments in this work are essentially an improvement on those in 
"Abolishing Unemployment" (Economic Research Council, London, Research Study No.7, 1980) by 
the same author.  
Imagesetting by: Alpha Word Power, Durham City. Printed by: The City Printing Works, Chester-Ie-
Street. First Published in December 1991 by R.S. Musgrave, 24 Garden Avenue, Framwellgate Moor, 
Durham, DH1 SEQ, England. © R.S.Musgrave 1991 ISBN: 0 9518841 0 7  
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Summary 
Workfare has had a chequered history because it has not been well thought out. It 
increases employment not just because it calls the bluff of the workshy; this element 
need not be all that harsh. It works because it acts as a marginal employment 
subsidy of a type not tried before (except unwittingly as part of workfare). The 
subsidy is as follows.  
As full employment is approached (i.e.given rising demand), dole queue labour gets 
progressively less suited to available vacancies, which induces employers to out bid 
each other in an attempt to attract or retain better quality or more suitable labour, 
and this is inflationary. This phenomenon is behind NAIRU, the level of 
unemployment below which it is allegedly impossible to go.  But the above 
unsuitability of the unemployed is temporary for each person: a job usually appears 
sooner or later for which they are suited. Thus the antidote is to compensate 
employers for this unsuitability, i.e. subsidise the unemployed into temporary jobs 
and this is more or less what workfare has always consisted of.  This ought to reduce 
NAIRU. 
The above NAIRU reducing characteristic of workfare is key to proving it should 
operate as much in the private as public sector. In fact it works better in the former 
because the private sector is better at employing relatively unskilled labour.  
It is often claimed that workfare should take the form of specially set up job creation 
schemes. The arguments for this do not stand inspection (and nor do a large 
majority of other arguments for these schemes). Thus workfare jobs should be with 
existing employers.  
To effect workfare in this form, the unemployed are made available to all employers 
at little or no charge to the latter, while the number of jobs so created is strictly 
limited so as to prevent employers replacing existing employees with workfare 
employees.  
The above all amounts to saying that there is a much stronger case for heavily 
subsidised temporary employment agencies than for subsidised normal 
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employment agencies (Job Centres in the U.K.). Or to put it yet another way, in a 
totally free market (i.e. in the absence of unemployment benefit) the unemployed 
have the choice of doing nothing, or doing a job other than their usual one for a 
while. To date, governments have subsidised only the former. This booklet claims 
governments should subsidise the latter activity (perhaps at the expense of the 
former).  
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Definitions  
The word workfare is used here to refer to giving the unemployed the choice of 
taking a government created job, a normal job, training, or, if they refuse these, 
having their unemployment benefit reduced.  
The phrase 'unemployment benefit' is used to refer to all forms of social security 
received by the unemployed.  
The above government created job is referred to with the phrase 'workfare job' or 
'workfare employment'.  
The phrase 'natural level of unemployment' is used in preference to non-accelerating 
inflation rate of unemployment. This is not to imply that the former is a better idea 
than the latter. In other words the phrase 'natural level' refers to whichever of the 
two, or variations on them, is the best idea. (For those not acquainted with 
economics, the natural level of unemployment is the level at which inflation becomes 
unacceptable.)  
 
Introduction  
The history of workfare is an unhappy one in that there is a lack of agreement as to 
what form it should take or whether it should operate at all. This disagreement 
partially explains the wide variety of different workfare schemes, particularly in the 
U.S., which are abandoned or greatly modified about as quickly as they are set up. 
The variety in the U.S. is also explained by the freedom individual states have had to 
design their own schemes. For the history see for example Rein (1982), Bernstein 
(1982), Helms (1983) or Burton (1987).  
The object of this paper is to reduce the disagreement a little, firstly by pointing to a 
merit of workfare which does not seem to have been appreciated hitherto, namely 
that it acts as a marginal employment subsidy of a type not tried before (except 
unwittingly as part of workfare schemes). This characteristic of workfare is key to 
showing that in contrast to most workfare schemes to date, there should be no bias 
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towards creating workfare jobs in the public rather than the private sector. It is also 
argued that the jobs should be with existing employers, not in the form of projects or 
or places of work specially set up to employ those who would otherwise be 
unemployed. The latter type of system will be called a “Job Creation Scheme” 
(J.C.S.). One reason for choosing this name (probably not a brilliant reason) is that 
there was a make work scheme in the UK around 1970 which fitted the above 
description and which was actually called “The Job Creation Scheme”. The work 
houses of the 18th and 19th centuries were also examples of a J.C.S. 
The main problem with J.C.S.s that the match of inputs (skilled labour, unskilled 
labour, capital equipment, etc.) is almost invariably superior with existing employers 
as compared to J.C.S.s. This is a simple point, but it is often overlooked even in 
works by leading labour market economists, a considerable blunder on their part.  
For the sake of brevity, the discussion below glosses over many of the differences 
between the social security system in different countries.  
 
The Marginal Employment Subsidy  
As full employment is approached (as Keynes (1936) p42 amongst others pointed 
out), dole queue labour becomes progressively less suited to the available 
vacancies. In other words the marginal net revenue product of labour starts to drop 
below the going wage.  
In a perfect market this would not happen, that is, there would be no such thing as 
the 'going' or standard wage. In the real world however there are several forces 
tending to bring about a standard or minimum wage in most professions:  
1. Minimum wage laws imposed by governments.  
2. Union imposed wage rates.  
3. Wage rates imposed by custom or administrative convenience.  
4.       The belief by a significant proportion of employers that paying less than some 
minimum is immoral (see Roberts (1986) p.72).  
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5. The belief by a significant proportion of employers that paying wages above the 
market price results in a well motivated and loyal workforce.  
6. Reluctance by employers to offer wages equal to or even near unemployment 
benefit because of the relatively few takers that result.  
At any rate, as employment rises, the above mentioned decline in the marginal net 
revenue product of labour induces employers to start bidding up the price of labour 
that is already employed (for example by poaching each other's employees) rather 
than take further labour from the ranks of the unemployed. (See Haveman (1970) for 
some research on the extent of poaching at different employment levels).  
But it is a nonsense to leave a portion of the workforce unemployed merely because 
revenue does not cover the wage. To the extent that the problem is inadequate 
marginal revenue, the solution must be some sort of marginal employment subsidy. 
Furthermore the above mentioned inadequate revenue product is a temporary 
phenomenon for each individual member of the dole queue; that is they find a job 
sooner or later where they are sufficiently productive to justify a wage. Thus the 
actual subsidy required i~ one that makes an unemployed person available to 
employers at a rate below the above mentioned standard or going rate, and does, so 
temporarily, that is pending the appearance of a vacancy that suits the person better, 
or is for other reasons more productive: a vacancy where the employer is prepared 
to finance the whole of the wage.  
Having set out the basic nature of the subsidy, there is a qualification that needs 
making which is thus. While the fundamental cause of some people's unemployment 
is temporary, that is, a temporary mismatch between supply and demand for their 
type of labour in their local labour market, it is equally true that the fundamental 
cause of a significant proportion of unemployment is not temporary. In short, a 
subsidy based on the above argument would reduce frictional unemployment but not 
the more long term mismatches, that is structural unemployment (though, as is 
shown below, it is not a bad second-best cure for some forms of structural 
unemployment).  
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Two false assumptions in Workfare  
We now turn to workfare and demonstrate that a temporary subsidised job based on 
the above argument comes to the same thing as the ideal workfare job. Before doing 
this however, two popular false assumptions behind workfare must be disposed of. 
The first is that the jobs concerned should be in the public sector and indeed nearly 
all workfare jobs to date have been in the public sector. The second, even narrower, 
assumption is that the work should be in the form of a J.C.S., rather than with 
existing public sector employers. For examples of these assumptions see Helms 
(1983) p.1, Minford (1985), p48, Burton (1987), and a very much earlier example 
comes from France in 1625 where Richelieu claimed that "the able bodied poor 
could be employed on public works" (Garraty (1979) p.46).  
The assumption that workfare should take the form of a J.C.S. will be examined first. 
Readers already convinced that there is no place for J.C.S.s may skip the following 
section, that is, go straight to the heading 'Marginal Employment Subsidy Workfare' 
on page 10.  
 
Job Creation Schemes  
Introduction  
'J.C.S.' is used here to refer to any organisation or employer set up partially or 
mainly to provide employment or work experience. In contrast, normal employers, 
public and private, do not aim to provide work experience (except as part of their 
own training needs). Also normal employers aim to minimise numbers employed in 
as far as this is consistent with other objectives like maximising profit or volume 
produced. For readers with any doubts as to the sort of scheme this definition is 
supposed to cover, a selection is listed in a footnote. 1  
1. Work Progress Administration (U.S. 1930s), Community Programme (U.K. 1980s), Job 
Creation Programme (U.K., 1970s), Employment Action (U.K., 1990s). At a pinch the 
workhouses of Europe and America in the 17th, 18th and 19th century might be classified as 
workfare in the form of job creation schemes.  
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Before examining J.C.S.'s, it is worth noting aspects of them which are certainly 
prima facie evidence that there is no good argument behind them. First, they are set 
up and abandoned with amazing rapidity, for example there have been about six 
J.C.S.s in the U.K. in the last twenty-five years. Secondly, as far as international 
comparisons go, there is little agreement on what the main objectives of these 
schemes is (for example see Jackson (1979) for some comparisons). Third, even the 
arguments in the literature of just one country can best be described as bright and 
varied. There is certainly no one fundamental theory to examine.  
 
Flaws in Job Creation Schemes  
Dealing with demand deficient unemployment is certainly not the role for J.C.S.s; this 
is best done by raising demand. Thus the role for J.C.S.s, if there is one, is to reduce 
the natural level of unemployment, a point about which there is general agreement in 
the literature.  
The first difficulty in setting up a J.C.S. when unemployment is at its natural level is 
that (as pointed out above) the quality of labour available is poor, or where suitable 
labour is available it is scarce. Thus any J.C.S. set up in these circumstances will 
have an odd mix of different types of labour, skilled and unskilled in particular. This 
poor match of inputs leads to inefficiency compared to the situation that would obtain 
if the labour were subsidised into work with existing employers, where labour ratios 
are better.  
The next point is that those employed on a J.C.S. must engage in a serious job 
search for normal jobs and be as willing to move to the latter as when unemployed. If 
this does not obtain, labour supply to the normal jobs market is reduced which is 
inflationary. (Any readers who do not agree, please see Appendix III). But this 
availability to normal jobs means that those concerned will quite their J.C.S. jobs on 
average within a few months of starting, in other words labour turnover will be high 
by the standards of a normal employer and hence make the inefficiency even worse.  
Again, in contrast to the above, if the same people were subsidised into work with 
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existing employers, the labour turnover of the people concerned would be the same, 
but the ratio of permanent staff to 'rapidly turning over' staff would be superior, which 
would result in higher output from the latter.  
It could be claimed in objection to the above that the failure of J.C.S. employees to 
job search would not significantly reduce labour supply to the extent that J.C.S.s are 
biased, as they often are, towards the employment of types of labour prone to higher 
than usual unemployment or towards high unemployment areas. (See Baily (1978) 
and Addison (1979) for a consideration of J.C.S. in this role.)  
The first answer to the above point is that it confuses issues that to a large extent are 
separate; in other words the fact that J.C.S.s may be suitable for dealing with the 
above 'specific type of labour' unemployment and regional unemployment does not 
prove they are the best means of putting workfare into effect. Put it another way, 
workfare as defined here is not primarily concerned with the above types of 
unemployment.  
However it might be argued that the unemployed are a specific type of labour, in that 
they tend to consist of the less skilled and enthusiastic members of the workforce. 
Furthermore, in the U.S., workfare has to a large extent concentrated on a specific 
type of labour: potentially employable labour that has become dependent on the 
welfare system. So the question as to whether J.C.S.s are better than existing 
employers for catering for specific types of labour is now considered. (High 
unemployment areas are considered several paragraphs hence.)  
The problem with J.C.S.s aimed at specific types of labour is that this exacerbates 
the above mentioned problem of the poor match of inputs. In other words the mere 
fact of concentrating one type of labour on a particular project leads to even worse 
inefficiency as compared to subsidising the labour concerned into employment with 
existing employers.  
The above point about the better match of inputs that obtains with employment 
subsidies may seem a simple one, but it is an example of the sort of simple point that 
needs making. For example Messrs Baily and Tobin, two of America's most 
reputable economists, failed to spot the point in their paper on the subject published 
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by the Brookings Institution (Baily (1978)). As a result they come to no firm 
conclusion on the relative merits of J.C.S.s and employment subsidies. (Even 
economists who have attacked J.C.S.s do not seem to have done so in a very 
competent manner, for example, J. T. Addison (1979) (see Appendix II)).  
It could be argued against the above paragraph but one that while the match of 
inputs may be better with employment subsidies, in practice there are two possible 
problems: first, the excess supply of some types of labour (of which youths may be 
an example) may be large, and secondly the elasticity of demand for the labour may 
be low. In consequence, even making the labour available to employers for free 
might not result in unemployment amongst the type of labour concerned being 
reduced to its natural level.  
A good answer to the above comes from the New Testament: if you have good wine 
and stale wine, you start with the former and only use of much of the latter as you 
have to. In other words the first step in dealing with the above unemployment is to 
subsidise the labour concerned into work with existing employers, and if necessary 
make the subsidy so heavy that the labour is in effect being allocated to employers 
for free, or thereabouts. In practice, the policy for youth unemployment, at least in 
the U.K. in the 1970s was the wrong way round; relatively large amounts were spent 
subsidising people into work on J.C.S.s; for example the wage on the Job Creation 
Programme was the going or union rate for the job. In contrast the amounts spent 
subsidising youths into work with existing employers were relatively small, for 
example £10 a week on the Young Workers scheme. The relative emphasis has 
improved somewhat since the 1970s, but not by nearly enough.  
If, after taking the above first step, the 'excess supply' type of unemployment still 
seems to be above its natural level, it is still highly questionable as to whether a 
J.C.S. should be implemented, and for the following reasons. If a particular type of 
labour is offered to employers for free, then the marginal net product of such labour 
will be zero. Given that J.C.S.s are less efficient than existing employers it follows 
that the net product of the labour on a J.C.S. will be negative. To be more precise, it 
would be physically possible to set up a positive net product J.C.S. in these circum-
stances by moving sufficient skilled labour, capital equipment, and so on from the 
existing economy; but this re-allocation of the above inputs would reduce GNP by 
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more than the J.C.S. could possibly increase it. In short the effective net product of 
the labour concerned would still be negative. If the advocates of J.C.S.s seriously 
want J.C.S.s in these circumstances, they must tell us why they are opting for what 
appears to be the worst of two alternatives. Furthermore, the word 'job', as in job 
creation scheme, is inappropriate; the word 'job' normally means to make a net 
contribution to national income. When output is negative, one is in the area of pure 
training or education, and not the 'job' area.  
As to whether there is justification for negative output work with existing employers, 
there possibly is, in that there is a training or 'learning by doing' element. The 
Victorians used to operate something along these lines in that apprentices and 
articled clerks sometimes had to pay for the privilege of being taken on. Paying 
employers to take on, and train people is one element of 'Employment Training' a 
scheme introduced in the U.K. a couple of years ago, though, as is shown 
elsewhere, other characteristics of Employment Training are not so desirable.  
Returning for a moment to the point made several paragraphs above namely that a 
type of labour in surplus, like youths, could be allocated to employers for free, this is 
a slight over-simplification in that it would be administratively difficult. For example, if 
government offered to underwrite all youth's wages, employers would double such 
wages overnight, which is not on. However, there would be no great administrative 
difficulty in a flat subsidy equal to the average youth wage or some fairly high 
proportion thereof (perhaps paid for by a tax on prime aged labour).  
Furthermore, this latter form of subsidy does not in any way invalidate the above 
points about the marginal net product of a particular type of labour. To illustrate, the 
fact that some employers are paying relatively productive youths more than the 
subsidy has nothing to do with what happens at the margin, that is with the least 
productive youths.  
One of the arguments used by J.C.S. enthusiasts against the above sort of subsidy 
for youths is that it induces employers to use youths 'as cheap labour' or that the 
type of labour concerned is given 'menial' work to do. The answers to this are as 
follows.  
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First, as is shown under criticism no 15 below, the word 'menial' is devoid of any 
significant meaning so far as practical labour market policy goes.  
Secondly, as has been shown above, work with existing employers is more 
productive than work on J.C.S.s. Advocates of the 'menial' argument must tell us 
why they have a right to sacrifice other peoples' living standards so as to satisfy their 
own idiosyncratic preferences.  
Thirdly, in view of some of the near fatuous activities that J.C.S.s involve, it is a little 
strange to claim that they involve vastly less menial work than work with existing 
employers.  
Returning from this diversion on youth employment to the main argument, the next 
step is to deal with the suggestion several paragraphs above that J.C.S.s can be 
used to deal with high unemployment areas. The problem with a J.C.S. in this role is 
that it is very hard to see the sense in such regions of having one group of heavily 
subsidised employers (J.C.S.s) working alongside another group (normal employers) 
which are not subsidised or not so heavily subsidised. It would make a great deal 
more sense to subsidise all or nearly all employers in the region by about the same 
amount, and indeed this is more or less what normal regional measures consist of: 
subsidies for every or nearly every employer in the region concerned, whether in the 
form of capital equipment subsidies or labour subsidies.  
Having done that, in other words offered about the same subsidy to every employer 
in the region concerned, J.C.S.s included, the latter are out of business because 
there is no way they can compete with normal employers.  
It might seem that the case for J.C.S.s is now starting to look weak.  
Unfortunately as pointed out above, the arguments dreamed up by advocates of 
these schemes are many and varied. In particular, there is one argument they are 
fond of, and could throw at the above argument on 'specific type of labour' 
unemployment and regional unemployment. It is that the cost per job to the taxpayer 
of a J.C.S. is small (which it is) compared to the cost per job created by the above 
sort of blanket subsidies for all labour in high unemployment areas or all members of 
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a particular type of labour. The answer to this is that cost per job is irrelevant and for 
the following reasons.  
J.C.S.s, as has been shown above, involve a misallocation of real resources as 
compared to subsidising the labour concerned into employment with existing 
employers. There have doubtless been cases of J.C.S.s with impressively low 'costs 
per job' being so inefficient that they contribute nothing to national income or even 
reduce it. Turning now to blanket subsidies, these certainly involve subsidising a 
large amount of labour that would be employed anyway (and hence involve a 
relatively high 'cost per job'), but assuming normal competitive forces are working, 
this money ends up back in the pockets of the taxpayer/consumer's from whence it 
originated, in the form of lower prices. It thus cannot be construed as a real cost, and 
certainly does not diminish national income. For those not convinced by this 
argument, an expanded version is set out in Appendix I.  
Another possible argument for J.C.S.s is that the sort of tasks they undertake can be 
of a kind not already undertaken by the existing public sector, and hence that there is 
a case for an organisation or type of employer different from the existing public 
sector. The flaw in this argument has to do with the value of the output concerned as 
is as follows.  
The decisions as to what the public sector shall produce, what the relative amounts 
of each public sector product shall be, and what the size of the public versus private 
sector shall be, are decisions taken by the electorate, not the market. Economists 
and those concerned with setting up J.C.S.s can only assume that the marginal 
product of different public sector departments and of the private sector are all the 
same. Now if a J.C.S. produces something substantially different from those public 
sector products that voters normally vote for, namely medical services, education, 
police, armed services and so on, then it must be assumed that the output will be of 
relatively little utility or worth compared to the output that would come from 
expanding the existing public and private sector. Alternatively, if a J.C.S. and the 
existing public sector produce the same product, this is duplication of effort.  
To summarise, four points have been made about subsidising people into work on 
J.C.S.s as compared to subsidising them into work with existing employers.  
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1. The ratios of different types of labour will be far from optimum.  
2. There will be high labour turnover.  
3.        To the extent that high labour turnover is avoided by concentrating on types of 
labour that are in surplus, this leads to even worse labour ratios. 4. Regarding the 
public sector, if these schemes produce something different from the existing public 
sector, the output will be of relatively little worth; alternatively if they produce the 
same as the existing public sector, this is duplication of effort.  
As to empirical evidence to support the above four points, it might be claimed by 
advocates of J.C.S.s that the evidence from the 1930s (e.g. Kesselman (1978)) is 
that while such schemes were certainly not as efficient as normal employers, output 
per head was sometimes well over three quarters that of normal employees. The first 
answer to this is that even if output were ninety-nine per cent that of normal 
employers, £100 a week of output is better than £99. Secondly in the 1930s there 
was massive demand deficient unemployment. In that J.C.S.s then were dealing with 
this form of unemployment, the above problems of high labour turnover and badly 
matched inputs would not have applied. Hence the good productivity.  
It should incidentally be pointed out that the argument so far has compared the 
allocation of particular types of labour to two types of employer, J.C.S.s and existing 
employers public and private. This is a slight over-simplification, in that there are 
shades of grey between the above two. The latter has been more common in the 
U.S. than elsewhere and has taken the form of concentrating specific types of labour 
in existing public sector institutions. All the arguments in the previous pages apply to 
this latter sort of policy just as much as to J.C.S.s: in other words the artificial 
concentration of any type of labour in any sector or part of the economy constitutes a 
misallocation of resources.  
 
Training  
Another argument cited for J.C.S.s is that they can combine employment and 
training. The first answer to this is that employment with existing employers can and 
does combine the two perfectly well. Moreover there are reasons for thinking J.C.S.s 
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are particularly poor at combining the two. Jackson (1979, Ch. 10) and Ridley 
(1980), p.265 give some reasons here. Also the combination suffers from the 
'timescale clash' pointed out in the penultimate paragraph of 'criticism No to' below.  
The above arguments, which are largely theoretical, seem to have been born out in 
practice in the case of 'Employment Training', a scheme in the U.K. which combines 
training and J.C.S.s. In other words the training in this schemes appears to have 
involved poor value for money (see Wood (1991) and Bassett (1991)).  
 
Seasonal or Cyclical Factors  
Another argument for J.C.S.s is that they are suitable for dealing with seasonal or 
cyclical unemployment, the former being of particular importance in Canada and 
Sweden (see Francomb (1979) and Janerus (1979) respectively). It is probably a 
measure of the weakness of the theory behind J.C.S.s that the above two authors 
confine themselves to describing the schemes in their respective countries, without 
giving any reasons for them being better than alternative measures for dealing with 
seasonal or cyclical employment.  
If seasonally unemployed labour is to be made available for free to J.C.S.s it is hard 
to see why it should not be made similarly available to existing employers public and 
private. A resource is allocated most efficiently when allocated to the highest bidder, 
not by artificially preventing the majority of potential bidders from bidding, or potential 
users from using the resource.  
It should be said in defence of Sweden's J.C.S.s that to a large extent they consist of 
bringing forward public sector projects that have already been planned, and in a few 
cases private employers take the labour concerned (e.g. see Ginsburg (1983) 
p.129). To this extent Sweden's job creation is not far from what is advocated in this 
paper.  
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Maintaining Skills  
The final argument for J.C.S.s to be considered here is that they enable those 
concerned to maintain their skills. This argument appears in the official literature 
produced to explain Employment Action, a J.C.S. just introduced in the U.K. at the 
time of writing. This is a poor argument in view of the narrow range of activities 
encompassed by J.C.S.s, Employment Action in particular. The actual range in the 
case of Employment Action is very typical of J.C.S.s and appears to consist of 
construction, horticulture, two or three others, and that's it.  
This weakness in J.C.S.s it should be emphasised, is an inevitable one; it is not just 
the result of how one or two such schemes happen to have been organised. This is 
because unless J.C.S.s infiltrate almost every industry and sector of the economy, 
they cannot hope to offer a wide variety of skilled work experience. For example 
complaints were being made in Sweden fifteen years ago that the type of work 
experience (and training) on J.C.S.s was irrelevant to the aspirations of those 
involved (this despite Sweden's job creation being on a much larger scale relative to 
its population than the U.K.).  
The conclusion at the end of this section is that none of the main arguments for 
J.C.S.s stand inspection. It is always dangerous to say there is no argument at all for 
something, but certainly the arguments for J.C.S.s are weak in the extreme.  
 
Marginal Employment Subsidy Workfare  
Having concluded that existing employers are preferable to J.C.S.s the question as 
to whether workfare labour should be allocated to just public employers or both 
public and private employers is now examined.  
Before doing this however a few words about the difference between public and 
private sectors are required. By definition the distinction between the two is who 
owns them. Unfortunately this is not the distinction relevant to workfare (or many 
other topics in economics). For our purposes the important distinction is between the 
sector that sells its output and the sector that gives away its output, which of course 
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does not coincide exactly with public and private sectors. This little problem will be 
solved by using the words public and private, but in reference to the 'give' and 'sell' 
sectors respectively. We now turn to the problem that private sector workfare 
requires an increase in demand and that this might be inflationary.  
The answer to this problem is that raising demand does not matter to the extent that 
such demand is channelled towards otherwise unemployed labour, and not towards 
types of labour in short supply. Now if workfare labour is made available at little or no 
charge to employers then the latter have a clear incentive to direct work towards the 
newly available labour. The exact extent to which the latter would obtain is of course 
hard to quantify without some extensive research and econometrics. That itself, if not 
the ideas in this paper would keep someone employed for a year!  
At any rate most readers will by now have realised that what is advocated here as 
being the best form of workfare amounts to all intents and purposes as the same 
thing as the marginal employment subsidy set out at the beginning; making the 
unemployed available to all employers at little or no charge to the latter pending the 
appearance for each person concerned of a normal vacancy.  
This will for want of a better phrase be called Marginal Employment Subsidy 
Workfare (MES Workfare). The word 'workfare' will still be used below, but will refer 
to the word as defined at the outset; this is a broader definition that incorporates 
MES Workfare and most workfare schemes in the U.S.  
Returning for a moment to the above mentioned difficulty in estimating the extent to 
which MES Workfare would improve the inflation/unemployment trade off, it might 
seem safer to leave it confined to the public sector because of the possible 
inflationary impact of private sector workfare. This idea however contains flaws, the 
first of which is best revealed by reconsidering the marginal employment subsidy set 
out at the beginning.  
Let us assume that the severity of the sanction involved and the wage for MES 
Workfare jobs is such that MES Workfare people have exactly the same incentive to 
seek normal jobs as when unemployed. Let us also assume that MES Workfare 
people are charged to employers at £x a week (perhaps because it is regarded as 
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not socially acceptable for people to do work where the net product is less than £x a 
week). As the number of MES Workfare people rises the point at which employers 
poaching each other's employees becomes excessive compared to the extent to 
which they take MES Workfare people will be the point at which the marginal product 
of MES Workfare people has dropped to about £x a week, or some function of £x a 
week. Furthermore there is not a vast difference between the organisation of, or 
working practices in, the public and private sectors. Thus the fact that at some point 
private sector MES Workfare ceases to contain inflation is no compensation for the 
public sector: at this point the marginal product of public sector MES Workfare will 
also have dropped to about £x a week or some function of it. Hence the latter cannot 
be expanded any further, given the assumptions with which we started.  
Of course these assumptions can be altered, but this still does nothing for the public 
sector. For example with a view to expanding the number of MES Workfare people 
they could be allocated to employers for free. All the above arguments still apply 
except that £x is replaced with £0. Furthermore so far as the private sector goes, no 
additional demand is required to create a zero net product job, and zero additional 
demand cannot possibly have an inflationary effect. It is doubtless justifiable to ask 
what the point of a zero net product job is. The answer it that it might perhaps be 
justifiable in terms of work experience and the 'employee to employer introduction' 
element involved.  
Another assumption made above was that MES Workfare people have the same 
incentive to seek normal work as when unemployed. Altering this assumption, again, 
does nothing for the public sector. For example if relatively generous wages are paid 
for MES Workfare jobs, this reduces the above incentive, the effect of which would 
be inflationary. Furthermore the inflationary effect is just the same in both sectors. In 
other words one MES Workfare person in the public sector failing to seek normal 
employment has exactly the same inflationary effect as one similar person in the 
private sector.  
Another point against the public sector is that it cannot even be claimed, if U.S. 
experience is any guide, that the public sector is less prone to fraud than the private 
sector, given sloppy administration. There have been cases where over half the so- 
called workfare employees in state governments were in fact normal permanent 
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employees. State governments were defrauding central government (see Johnson 
(1979).  
The final point against any bias towards the public sector is that the proportion of 
public sector employees who are skilled is higher than in the private sector. Since 
MES Workfare jobs would be concentrated at the unskilled end of the spectrum, the 
public sector is less suited to MES Workfare than the private sector.  
The conclusion is that there is certainly no logic in any preference for the public 
sector; if anything there is a case for a bias in favour of the private sector.  
To summarise so far, it is advocated here that there is a case for subsidised 
temporary jobs for the unemployed with all existing employers, with government in 
effect operating a subsidised temporary employment agency. Indeed the case for 
this is probably stronger than the case for government subsidised normal 
employment agencies (Job Centres in the U.K.). It is far from clear that the flow of 
information about jobs provided by newspaper adverts, private employment 
agencies, and so on is less than the optimum in the absence of Job Centres, a point 
which private agencies made in no uncertain terms when Job Centres first arrived. In 
contrast, MES Workfare, or subsidised temporary agencies, would deal with some 
very obvious and blatant labour market defects: the six points set out at the 
beginning.  
 
Implementing MES Workfare  
The basic problem in implementing MES Workfare is how to make labour available 
to employers at little or no charge without them replacing their existing employees 
wholesale with MES Workfare people with a view to reducing payroll costs. There 
are at least four ways of controlling this problem which are as follows.  
1. Limit the number of MES Workfare people to a small proportion of each 
employer's workforce.  
2. Limit the number allowed by the government employment agency in a particular 
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town or area.  
3. Charge employers a relatively large amount for the labour.  
4. Limit the time for which a MES Workfare person stayed with a particular employer. 
One workfare scheme (in Utah) placed a twelve week limit on the duration of 
workfare jobs (Germanis (1983), p. 144).  
As to time limits, it is important to distinguish between limiting the time someone 
stays in the workfare system (regardless of how many different employers they work 
for) and on the other hand limiting the time someone stays with a particular 
employer. There is no reason to limit people's time in the system as long as they are 
making serious attempts to find normal jobs. In contrast, as intimated in point No 4 
above, limiting the time someone stays with a given employer is desirable so as to 
make it difficult for the employer to use them as substitutes for normal permanent 
employees. Of course there must be something to dissuade people from staying in 
the system too long: the best measures are keeping the workfare wage relatively low 
and/or spending more on government employment agency job search efforts.  
These issues seem to have been somewhat confused in Utah in that they limited the 
time people stayed with a particular employer so as to encourage them to find 
normal jobs. Doubtless the desired cause-effect relationship existed to some extent, 
but they were not using the right tools for the job.  
The above twelve week limit adopted in Utah is probably of much the right order, 
assuming the time limit method of control was used for MES Workfare. This is 
because MES Workfare amounts to doing very much what would occur in a totally 
free market; unemployment benefit is not a free market phenomenon (except to the 
extent that people would voluntarily take out insurance against unemployment) and 
in the absence of unemployment benefit, people would to a greater extent than at 
present when made unemployed take jobs other than the ones they wanted pending 
the appearance of the latter. Now the average time for which people are unemployed 
is roughly twelve weeks, thus if MES Workfare is to mimic the free market, then 
twelve weeks looks about right.  
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Indeed the very fact that MES Workfare mimics the free market is evidence that it 
would reduce unemployment, since in a perfect market there is no unemployment.  
There is not a vast amount to choose between the above four methods of controlling 
the number of MES Workfare people. The time limit is probably better than limiting 
the numbers with each employer. This is because the number of temporary and 
relatively unskilled people that employers can use varies widely, and there is no 
good reason it should not be allowed to vary widely. Indeed the introduction of MES 
Workfare might result in some firms setting up entirely new operations, like simple 
assembly operations employing largely MES Workfare people.  
Lest there be any doubt that the time limit would keep control of the system, it should 
be remembered that probably a good ninety per cent of the employees of most firms 
have skills specific to their firms and the latter would not be able to afford to lose 
them by registering them as MES Workfare. For example the lowliest office job, 
making the tea and coffee, involves skills specific to the office concerned. It can be a 
nuisance if the tea brewer quits: permanent staff have to sacrifice working time to 
teaching the replacement how to work canteen equipment without wrecking it, and 
so on. In short the role for MES Workfare employees is assisting existing permanent 
employees, not replacing them, although some replacement is bound to occur.  
As to using the price employers pay for MES Workfare people as the control, a 
relatively high price has the advantage that it will raise the net product of those 
involved. The disadvantage is that the nearer the price comes to what employers 
would have to par in the absence of MES  
Workfare, the more likely they are to take on 'already employed' labour rather than 
dole queue labour, hence the 'natural level of unemployment reducing' effect of MES 
Workfare is reduced.  
 
The Variable Elements in MES Workfare  
In addition to the above mentioned four variables than can be used to control 
displacement of normal employees by MES Workfare employees, MES Workfare 
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incorporates several other elements that can be varied by large amounts depending 
on how one views the relevant costs and benefits. These are as follows.  
1.       The period of unemployment allowed before sanctioning those who insist on 
remaining unemployed.  
2. The size of the sanction, that is the amount of benefit reduction.  
3.       The sophistication with which the system is run. The bare essentials are 
obvious: government must keep track of who is working for which employer 
(something it does anyway in most developed countries) and must administer some 
method of keeping control of the total number of MES Workfare people, like one or 
more of the above four methods. But over and above these basic requirements there 
are numerous possible refinements. For example employers and employees could 
report back to government about each other with a view to weeding out employers 
trying to abuse the system in some way and with a view to sorting out the unem-
ployables from the employables.  
4. The wage paid to those doing MES Workfare.  
5. Number of MES Workfare people.  
6.       Number of unemployed. It might perhaps seem that since the aim is to remove 
people from the dole queues and into MES Workfare, that the number of 
unemployed and number of MES Workfare people would change inversely or even 
that the sum of the two would equal some constant. However neither of these would 
necessarily obtain; for example, a very harsh policy would result in the sum of the 
two declining.  
7.       National Income  
It is not the purpose of this paper to advocate any particular level for the above 
seven variables. A few paragraphs will however be devoted to showing that MES 
Workfare is a flexible policy, that is to showing roughly by how much some of the 
above variables can be varied. The relevance, of this is that to the extent that it is a 
flexible policy, it is one that can form a permanent part of overall employment policy 
regardless of changes in the political climate, or changes in how leniently or harshly 
it is deemed desirable to treat the unemployed. We start with wages.  
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The Wage  
The wage paid to MES Workfare people is made up of the hourly rate and hours per 
week. The higher the wage, the less the incentive to seek normal jobs, the effect of 
which would be inflationary, though the wage needs to be at least a token amount 
above unemployment benefit. As to hours worked, it is possible in some cases that 
unions would insist on some minimum hourly rate; thus to keep the weekly wage 
within limits, the work might well have to be part time. This meshes nicely with the 
fact that it might bl: desirable to leave those concerned with some free time to job 
search. The above mentioned workfare scheme in Utah involved three days work a 
week and two days left for job searching (Germanis (1983) p.144). An alternative 
would be to allocate MES Workfare people in pairs with each member of the pair 
working half a week. This would amount to one full time employee and would be of 
value where the vacancy needed to be occupied for every hour of the working week.  
While as pointed out above generous pay for those on workfare has an inflationary 
effect, other things being equal, there is nothing to prevent relatively generous pay, 
as long as 'other things' are altered: in other words the reduced job search efforts by 
MES Workfare people could be compensated for by an increased job search effort 
by government employment agencies. But of course the price paid for this is a 
reduction in national income. This policy of relatively generous pay is roughly 
speaking the position in Sweden and for the following reasons. One can argue the 
J.C.S.s there amount to workfare in that there is more pressure on the unemployed 
to get out to work than in the U.K. The pay on such schemes is the going rate for the 
job, and to compensate, there are about six times as many employment exchange 
people per thousand unemployed as in the U.K. This of course is a thoroughly crude 
analysis of Sweden's policy, but it illustrates the point.  
While relatively small increases in pay for MES Workfare jobs over and above 
unemployment benefit can be countered easily enough by increased government 
employment agency job search efforts, the problems become much more serious as 
the wage for MES Workfare approaches that which the employees concerned would 
expect to get in their normal employment. Indeed if the net attractions of MES 
Workfare, taking into consideration the hours (probably relatively few), the demands 
of the work (probably fairly light), exceed the net attractions of a normal job, there is 
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no way of inducing those concerned to move from one to the other. In Sweden 
considerable difficulty has been experienced sometimes in getting people to move 
from job creation work to normal jobs. A partial solution to this, suggested by Ashby 
(1988) is to hold back a proportion of the wage until those concerned get normal 
jobs.  
 
The Sanction  
Having considered the wage for MES Workfare, we now turn to the sanction. There 
is no question but that some sort of sanction is required, indeed most developed 
countries' benefit systems have sanctions for those who stay on unemployment 
benefit for too long. However there is evidence that the behaviour of the unemployed 
is less responsive to changes in the weekly income derived from unemployment 
benefit than to their perception of how efficiently the social security system is being 
run, that is how closely the unemployed think they are being watched (e.g. see 
Layard (1986) Ch. 4, Burton (1987) pp. 4 and 17, and Bernstein (1982) pp. 46-49). 
Also Sweden has relatively generous unemployment benefit, yet this does not result 
in high unemployment. Thus just as generous MES Workfare wages are feasible, 
though at the expense of administration costs, a light sanction is probably also 
feasible, but again at the expense of administration costs. (There has been a 
movement in this direction in the U.K. in very recent years in the form of 'Restart' 
interviews.)  
Indeed, given the big difference between workfare as advocated in this paper and 
workfare in its more traditional forms, a light sanction would make it so different from 
its traditional meaning that it would be something of a nonsense to call it workfare.  
Turning now to a relatively large scale MES Workfare scheme with a relatively harsh 
sanction, there are some perfectly good arguments for this sort of policy. For 
example it could well be argued as did Beveridge (1942, pp. 57 and 58) that the 
maximum period of unconditional unemployment benefit should be closely related to 
age, with a six months maximum for older people reducing to practically nothing for 
youths. The logic in this of course is that young people can adapt to new jobs, MES 
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Workfare or otherwise, relatively quickly. Indeed the above six month limit is not 
based on any objective criteria: one could well argue that if someone cannot find a 
vacancy in their normal profession within two months of becoming unemployed, that 
is quite possibly because demand for the profession has declined on a permanent 
basis or at least for a matter of years, hence the sooner they start gaining experience 
in some other working environment the better. If on the other hand a vacancy of the 
sort originally required turns up, then the person concerned will have lost nothing in 
doing a MES Workfare job, or other job, for a while. Indeed unless the person 
concerned is feeble minded, then they will almost certainly have gained something: 
there is almost no such thing as a job in which those with their eyes open do not 
learn something.  
Further arguments on this point are set out under 'criticisms number nine' below.  
As to reducing the time for unconditional unemployment much below two months, 
the argument against this of course is that of those made unemployed at any given 
point in time, the proportion finding jobs in the early weeks of unemployment is 
relatively high, but declines as time passes. In other words too short a period would 
result in a relatively large number of very short term MES Workfare jobs, the costs of 
which might exceed the benefits.  
 
MES Workfare and Structural Unemployment  
An important aspect of any employment measure is the extent to which it deals with 
types of unemployment other than the one for which it is designed. This is because it 
is impossible to gauge with any accuracy how much unemployment is frictional, 
structural, voluntary, cyclical and so on. MES Workfare scores quite well in this 
respect.  
i) Like unemployment benefit it would act as a counter cyclical device, assuming it 
were so organised that the number of MES Workfare people varied with the number 
of unemployed. Arguably it would work better than unemployment benefit because it 
would act from the supply side as well as the demand side. In other words if the 
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number of MES Workfare people rose in a recession this would help keep 
employers' costs down and thus help them sell a relatively constant volume of 
goods. (Palmer (1978) p. 36 suggests employment subsidies might make good 
counter cyclical devices.)  
ii) As to high unemployment regions one way of ameliorating the problem is a 
straight labour subsidy (which was tried in the U.K. about twenty years ago in the 
form of Regional Employment Premium). Clearly such regions require more full time 
permanent jobs, but part time temporary jobs in the form of MES Workfare would be 
a second best.  
iii) Another problem, highlighted by Berthoud (1978), is the difficulty trainees have 
adjusting to their new jobs: many of them fail because the change is too abrupt or 
because they cannot compete with more experienced people in the trade concerned. 
The ideal solution as Berthoud makes clear is some form of transitional subsidy. 
However a second best would be MES Workfare. (This point is doubtless of 
relevance to Employment Training, a scheme introduced in the U.K. a couple of years 
ago.)  
iv)  Unemployment is to a significant extent caused by the sheer inability or lack of 
intelligence of a proportion of the workforce. There are all shades of grey between 
geniuses and morons, a point which crude devices like the minimum wage rules set 
out at the beginning totally fail to take into account. The ideal measure to counter a 
serious lack of ability is some form of permanent employment subsidy for those 
concerned. But again, a temporary subsidy in the form of MES Workfare would be a 
second best.  
 
Criticisms of MES Workfare  
There are numerous criticisms that can be made of MES Workfare, and some of 
these are dealt with below. They are listed in the contents page at the beginning 
so that readers can skip those that do not interest them  
1. MES Workfare people would displace existing employees  
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This sub-section is divided into two. The first deals with actual displacement. The 
second deals with the possibility that fear of displacement would induce unions 
(or non-union labour) to obstruct the system.  
 
Actual Displacement  
A finite amount of displacement is bound to occur, but it would be those on the 
verge of being unemployed anyway who would get displaced: put it another way, 
employers would not register their most valuable employees as MES Workfare; 
that way they would just lose them. Also this form of displacement occurs under 
the existing system: the unemployed and the least productive people in work are 
constantly displacing each other.  
While displacement would usually be undesirable, there is arguably an instance 
of where it might be desirable: the displacement of permanent unskilled staff. It 
could be said that unskilled vacancies are best filled by those who temporarily 
cannot find jobs using their skills. If the latter people displace others from 
unskilled jobs and the displaced people move on to jobs using their skills or to 
training, that might make sense, though of course if the displaced person had no 
skills and could not learn any, the displacement would be undesirable.  
It might be said in objection to the above that there cannot be many instances of 
skilled people occupying unskilled vacancies. It is certainly true that this would 
not obtain to any great extent in a free market, but unfortunately the labour 
market is a long way from being a free market: wages are to a significant extent 
determined by unions which have a positive dislike of free markets. For example 
the teachers' unions in the U.K. have long obstructed additional pay for 
mathematics and physics teachers relative to that of other teachers so as to deal 
with the shortage of mathematics and physics teachers. 1  
Another example comes from the engineering industry in the u.K. which a few 
years ago found itself unusually short of skilled workers and did some research 
to find out where the skilled employees had gone. A significant proportion were 
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found doing unskilled jobs like postmen. The reason for this was doubtless not 
entirely unconnected with the fact that Post Office unions are in a position to exploit 
the monopoly position of their employer, whereas engineering firms face genuine 
competition.  
Another type of displacement to which some readers might wish to point is the type 
that would occur if a government introduced MES Workfare but subsequently failed 
to raise demand, or failed to raise it by an amount that corresponded to the reduction 
in the natural level of unemployment brought about by MES Workfare. This is a trivial 
objection to MES Workfare and for the following reasons.  
Every device employed by governments to reduce the natural level, training or 
subsidised employment agencies for example, suffer the same defect; that is 
governments normally have only the vaguest idea as to by how much such 
measures reduce the natural level. Furthermore they do not earmark particular 
amounts of increased demand to take advantage of the reduced natural level. This is 
because while no government can ever know exactly where the natural level is, it 
can nevertheless keep the actual level of unemployment hovering around the natural 
level by doing exactly what every government does, namely keeping demand as high 
as is consistent with avoiding too much inflation.  
1. Apart from the free market, there is only one other known method of resource allocation: 
the bureaucracy, which in the case of labour equals direction of labour. Unions do not like 
the latter either. The policy of the trade union movement in the U.K. thus seems to be: 
obstruct both of the basic methods of getting people into jobs and then blame whatever 
government is in power for the resulting unemployment.  
 
Another form of displacement is that which occurs with any attempt to subsidise an 
over priced type of labour into work: there is always a finite increase in 
unemployment amongst other types of labour. This is because subsidising the 
overpriced type of labour into work must add a finite amount to inflationary pressure, 
hence a reduction in inflationary pressure must be obtained from somewhere to 
compensate. With luck, the overpriced type of labour will be on a relatively flat part of 
its Phillips curve and the rest of the labour force on a relatively steep part, hence a 
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relatively large increase in employment for the overpriced type of labour can be 
brought about in exchange for a small decrease in employment for the rest of the 
labour force. (see Baily (1978) for more on this.)  
 
Fear of displacement  
Fear of displacement would induce unions or even non-unionised labour to make 
MES Workfare unworkable.  
There are several answers to this.  
i) The proportion of the workforce that is unionised is less than half in the u.K. and 
less than a quarter in the U.S. Thus there is not "much chance of unions as such 
totally obstructing the system. Furthermore, MES Workfare as pointed out earlier is 
somewhat more suited to the private sector than the public sector, and the private 
sector is less heavily unionised than the public sector.  
As to Sweden where over three-quarters of the workforce is unionised, there is a 
yawning gulf between the behaviour of unions in Sweden and in the U.K. The 
policy of unions in Sweden is (or certainly was) to make an intelligent 
assessment of any new proposal and back it if it looks like being in the interests 
of the country as a whole.  
ii) The mere existence of an obstruction is not necessarily an argument for 
paying much attention to it; unions have on occasions obstructed new 
technology ever since the Luddites and in the U.K. have obstructed half the 
training schemes introduced since the second World War. This is hardly a good 
argument against new technology or training. (This is not to imply that it is only 
working class unions which obstruct training: middle class 'professional 
associations' (which are in effect trade unions) can be equally guilty, for example 
the medical profession in the U.S. and Australia places strict limits on the 
numbers of doctors being trained so as to boost their incomes. Anyone 
interested in what the free market price for doctors would be might care to look 
at Russia where doctors get about the same as truck drivers.)  
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iii) Every employer is continually hiring new employees for various reasons: 
replacement of retiring employees, fluctuations in demand and so on. It is far 
from a rarity for an employer to find some of the new recruits more efficient than 
existing employees, and hence to sack or make redundant the less productive 
existing employees at the first opportunity. In other words if employees are going 
to obstruct MES Workfare, one has to wonder why they do not obstruct all new 
employees.  
iv) Once MES Workfare was generally understood, permanent employees would 
not object to MES Workfare because the latter would be seen as temporary. 
There is no widespread obstruction in the hiring of temporary labour from 
temporary employment agencies.  
v) In practice in the U.S., the objections from public sector unions to workfare 
people have not been of such proportions as to scupper it.  
Returning to temporary employment agencies for a moment, it might seem that 
MES Workfare would cut into their share of the market. No doubt this would 
happen to some extent and protests would ensue just as protests came from 
existing employment agencies when Job Centres first arrived in the U.K. 
However MES Workfare and temporary employment agencies would be in 
essentially different sections of the market. The former deals with relatively 
unproductive labour allocated to employers at little or no charge whereas the 
latter deals with labour that is fully qualified (or at least ostensibly qualified) for 
the jobs concerned and is charged to employers at above the normal hourly rate 
for the type of labour concerned.  
 
2. MES Workfare would result in some near futile forms of employment  
The above would obtain to some extent. But there are several reasons for thinking 
this does not matter too much.  
First, at least low output work would provide the unemployed with experience of new 
working environments which for youths or those with redundant skills might help 
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them decide in which environment they wished in the future to work.  
Secondly, unemployment is to a significant extent a self perpetuating phenomenon 
and for several reasons: (i) it can become a way of life; (ii) a closely related 
phenomenon is the 'discouraged job searcher' effect - when people cannot find a job, 
some of them cease looking even when there are jobs available; and (iii) there is the 
so-called dual labour market phenomenon - first there are those with secure jobs, 
some of them not well paid but secure nevertheless, and secondly there are those 
who get shifted from one insecure job to another, often as not via the dole queue. 
The latter group can be forgiven for failing to seek work if their past experience tells 
them that after a short while they will end up back where they started, on the dole. 
MES Workfare, even where it involved very low output, would reduce the extend of 
these 'self-perpetuating' forms of unemployment.  
Thirdly, it is very hard to say to what extent low revenue product proves that the 
output really is of little value or utility. People are unemployed not necessarily 
because whatever they wish to produce is of little value or utility, but often because 
there is a lack of demand or money with which to pay for their output.  
Finally, the criticism that MES Workfare would involve work of very little worth is not 
one that a sizable proportion of the population are, in a position to make because of 
the very low output work which they themselves advocate. For example advocates of 
J.C.S.s can hardly make the above criticism of MES Workfare.  
Also, the political left has over the last few decades in the U.K. usually been keen to 
see uneconomic jobs subsidised, sometimes even where output is literally zero. For 
example the least economic coal mines prior to the last coal miners' strike in the U.K. 
were not just making a loss; the value of coal coming out of the mines did not cover 
the cost of equipment, fuel, and so on consumed. Output was zero or negative. Just 
the same goes for those employed making Concorde (supported it must be said by 
people from right across the political spectrum).  
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3. There are few workshy amongst the unemployed, thus no form of workfare 
is justified.  
The answers to this are as follows.  
i) A study of unemployment benefit claimants in the U.K. by Daniel (1974, pp. 28 and 
124) found that around 12% had no intention of seeking work. Of the remainder, just 
under a half were making less than one job application per month. This survey was 
done at a time of labour shortage; there were thus a relative abundance of jobs to 
apply for. A survey by the Department of Employment when unemployment was 
much higher found 25% had taken no steps to find work in the week of their survey. 
(D.E. Gazette, October 1985, p. 393).  
The reasons given for not job searching, at least in the case of the above 12%, were 
reasonable enough. About three-quarters of these gave ill health, family or domestic 
problems or the fact that they regarded themselves as too old to work as the 
reasons. It is a nonsense to count these people as unemployed. Doubtless some of 
them should get some sort of benefit, but it should not be called unemployment 
benefit.  
Thus it is not suggested here that a large proportion of unemployment benefit 
claimants are workshy. It is suggested however that the proportion not looking for 
work is quite large enough to help justify something like Workfare which helps 
distinguish the genuinely unemployed from others.  
ii) When the unemployed are faced with a serious workfare sanction or when Social 
Security staff start making serious enquiries as to whether a given group of 
unemployed are actually able to work and are seeking work, it is common for up to 
half of them to cease claiming benefits. (See Burton (1987) p.9 and 17 for the U.K. 
and Bernstein (1982) pp.46 to 49 for the U.S.  
It is probably not entirely a coincidence that the social security system in the two 
European countries with the lowest unemployment levels over the last thirty years in 
Europe, Switzerland and Sweden, do make what might be called "serious enquiries 
as to whether the unemployed are actually able and willing to work". For example in 
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Switzerland the unemployed have to report twice a week to the unemployment 
benefit office on their job search efforts (Fluckiger (1985) p. 32).  
It might be argued against the above Swiss practice that it constitutes harassment of 
the unemployed. The answer to this is that when someone is being paid to do 
something, engage in a job search or anything else, it is perfectly reasonable to 
check up on what they are doing. Most employees have their seniors checking up on 
what they are doing much more often than twice a week. If the Swiss practice 
constitutes harassment, then every other employee on planet Earth is being 
harassed.  
iii) The above suggestion that an expansion of the 'welfare culture' has a lot to do 
with the apparent rise in unemployment gains some sort of support from the figures 
for invalidity benefit in the U.K.: the number of 'invalids' has trebled to just over a 
million over the last twenty-five years despite the health of the population improving 
in the meantime (see Disney (1991) for more on this). To some extent this more 
relaxed attitude to the disbursement of taxpayers' money is acceptable as we grow 
richer; indeed both unemployment and invalidity benefit are in effect being used as 
flexible retirement systems; the proportion of those over 55 on these benefits is 
relatively high. But whether acceptable or not, it is important not to count people as 
unemployed when they are effectively retired.  
iv) The proportion of the unemployed in the U.K. who are unemployed for over a year 
has risen from under a quarter in the early seventies to just about a half in the mid-
eighties. This is certainly consistent with increased voluntary unemployment. In other 
words if an increased number of people who are essentially not in the labour market 
are picking up unemployment benefit for as long as they can because it is there for 
the asking, then the result will be a rising proportion of long term unemployed.  
 
4. Time is needed for job searching  
Mattilo (1974) found that fifty to sixty per cent of job changers in the U.S. do so with 
no intervening unemployment. In addition to this there is a proportion that finds its 
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new jobs before leaving its old jobs, but decides to take a period of unemployment, 
at the taxpayers' expense, between jobs. Thus job searching at the same time as 
working cannot be desperately difficult.  
Furthermore there would be nothing to prevent those intent on spending a large 
amount of time job searching being excused MES Workfare jobs as long as they 
produce evidence that they have been job searching. In Switzerland all the 
unemployed have to keep a record of job applications, plus there is a fine of up to 
20,000 Swiss Francs (about £8,000) for anyone faking their records.  
 
5. MES Workfare is little different from some other subsidies, actual or 
proposed  
Given the vast number of employment schemes and subsidies that have been 
proposed and/or implemented and/or abandoned in developed countries over the 
last few decades, it is certain that MES Workfare will be similar to some of them. It 
would take an entire book to deal with all of them, thus only a few are considered 
below.  
First, though, where MES Workfare is similar to an existing system, there is no 
demerit in MES Workfare. The purpose of this paper is to set out some theory 
against J.C.S.s and in favour of temporary subsidised jobs with existing employers. 
Where a temporary subsidised employment scheme already exists, this theory will 
underpin it, and may. also be helpful in identifying weaknesses.  
One marginal subsidy that might appear similar to the subsidy on which MES 
Workfare is based is the one that rewards employers in proportion to the increase in 
each employer's workforce as compared to some base or starting date. Perhaps the 
earliest example of this comes from Pigou (1927), but there has been a steady 
stream of advocates of the same idea ever since and several instances of the idea 
being implemented. Unfortunately many of the attempts to discredit the idea have 
been somewhat laboured, when in fact the fallacies in the idea are quite simple.  
The most obvious flaw, which numerous authors have pointed out, is that the longer 
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the subsidy lasts, the more absurd it becomes, to illustrate: ten years after the 
starting date relatively new firms would be receiving large subsidies, whereas similar 
competing firms whose workforce had remained constant over the period would get 
no subsidy at all.  
This has led some proponents of the idea to advocate it as just a short term 
measure. However, it does not even reduce the natural level of unemployment in the 
short term and for reasons connected with the decline in the marginal product of 
labour set out at the beginning, which are thus: the subsidy does nothing whatever to 
alleviate the fundamental problem that arises as full employment is approached, 
namely the fact that 'already employed' labour becomes better value for money than 
dole queue labour. That is, the subsidy does nothing to raise the relative attractions 
of the latter.  
There is another category of employment subsidy with which MES Workfare might 
be confused, namely other subsidies aimed at the less skilled or productive 
members of the workforce (for example see Jackman (1986). Methods used to 
identify the people involved include low pay (as in Jackman's proposal), lack of skill, 
or the mere fact of having been unemployed for some time. The essential difference 
between these and MES Workfare is the size of the subsidy per person and the fact 
that MES Workfare is aimed at the temporarily unproductive whereas the above 
subsidies are aimed at the permanently unproductive (though the latter subsidies 
would doubtless in practice end up supporting a number of short term jobs).  
The difference between MES Workfare and the other above mentioned subsidies is 
essentially an example of the point made at the outset, namely that MES Workfare is 
aimed at frictional and voluntary unemployment, whereas other remedies are best 
suited to structural unemployment.  
 
Employment Training  
The above, (ET), is a scheme introduced in the U.K. a couple of years ago. It has 
similarities to MES Workfare.  
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ET is designed to ease the longer term unemployed back into work by a combination 
of work and training, either on J.C.S.s or with existing employers. It can be argued 
that ET amounts to workfare in that at about the same time as introducing it, the 
government started tightening up on unemployment benefit by means of 'Restart' 
interviews. Readers with a grasp of the arguments behind MES Workfare will have 
no difficulty in seeing differences and similarities to ET, but for those who want to 
see the two compared and the weaknesses in ET spelled out, the following para-
graphs do this.  
First, as to the J.C.S. element in ET, J.C.S.s are deal with near the outset.  
Turning now to ET with existing employers, the most obvious characteristic in ET 
which is indicative that something is wrong is thus: at least ninety per cent of the 
unemployed including the medium and long term unemployed have always 
succeeded in getting new jobs without any form of retraining. This is a very stark and 
strange contrast to the fact that all those on ET get some form of training. In other 
words the assumption that because someone is unemployed they therefore need, or 
can benefit from, training is totally false. This is not to suggest we do not need more 
training; possibly we should double expenditure on it. It is just the above assumption 
that is wrong.  
To illustrate, there are several categories of labour for whom a straight employment 
subsidy without training (MES Workfare or other) will usually be the most appropriate 
measure. These are as follows:  
i) The majority of the unemployed in the U.K. have some sort of paper qualification, 
some of them good qualifications. The latter are unlikely to benefit from the sort of 
relatively low grade training offered by ET. But they could do with a temporary job in 
their desired profession. Furthermore, society at large would benefit from their 
services.  
ii)  A slightly different category are those about to start or halfway through training for 
some profession where training is well organised, or better organised than on ET. 
University students during their vacation are an example.  
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iii) There are the voluntarily unemployed. These people need to be faced with the 
choice of working or ceasing to claim benefits. MES Workfare gives them that 
choice. They may subsequently engage in training, but that is a separate issue. 
Furthermore it is questionable as to whether the taxpayer has an obligation to pay for 
the training of those whose attachment to the labour market is a half-hearted one.  
iv) There are those near the end of their working life. Again, it is highly questionable 
as to whether taxpayers' money should be devoted to training here. A straightforward 
employment subsidy, MES Workfare, or other, is probably better.  
It might be claimed in objection to the above four points that there are schemes 
which offer short term subsidised employment without training, hence the above 
criticism is invalid. The answer to this is there are no such schemes at the time of 
writing (end of 1991). However employment and training schemes are set up and 
abandoned with such rapidity in the U.K. that this may have changed by the time of 
reading.  
A weakness in formal training on existing employers' premises for a specific length of 
time which ET involves is that the labour concerned is not available to the rest of the 
labour market, hence ET in this form does not reduce unemployment (readers who 
do not agree, see Appendix III). Alternatively, where the training is not for a specific 
length of time, it follows that the training cannot be good quality (see penultimate 
paragraph of criticism No 10).  
The implication of the above is a serious one, namely that any combination of work 
and training on the employer's premises which lasts for a specific length of time, 
which we shall call apprenticeship, is undesirable. Certainly there is a clash between 
the requirements of someone who ·wants a given amount of practical experience 
and theoretical learning as quickly as possible, and the requirements of the labour 
market which needs as much flexibility as possible. The answer to this little problem 
is that there is nothing wrong with a substantial proportion of those who wish to 
enhance their skills aiming to do so by means of apprenticeship as long as they are 
open to the influence of the market forces that alter the ratios of different types of 
labour when the pattern of demand changes. To illustrate with a simple example, in 
an economy consisting of just farmers and builders in a 50:50 ratio with equal 
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numbers of apprentices, it would be fatuous for the apprentices or for the society at 
large to ignore a change in demand that altered the ratio to say 60:40. Some 
apprentices halfway through their apprenticeship would have to change, or it might 
pay some of them to learn both skills.  
In short, there are good arguments behind subsiding education and training, and for 
subsidising short term jobs in the form of MES Workfare or similar. It is questionable 
however whether the state should subsidise the tying down of people to particular 
employers for specific lengths of time.  
 
6. MES Workfare would invite fraud  
MES Workfare would certainly invite some fraud, but this must be set against the 
system it replaces or partially replaces, namely unemployment benefit. The latter 
consists at worst of offering people free money for claiming they cannot find work. It 
is hard to imagine a bigger invitation to fraud than this.  
Indeed MES Workfare would consist of partially legalising and properly organising a 
fraud that is currently not exactly a rarity, namely working on the side while in receipt 
of benefits.  
A fraud that MES Workfare would tend to give rise to would consist of employers 
registering employees who they regarded as temporary anyway as MES Workfare 
people. This fraud would be limited to some extent by the fact that employers like to 
have control of when a temporary employee leaves, whereas the employer would 
have less such control in the case of a MES Workfare employee. Nevertheless this 
fraud is a potential problem and might be particularly common in industries with a 
much higher than usual labour turnover, like the building industry. In view of this it 
might be necessary to have special regulations for such industries, just as in the U.K. 
there are special regulations in the building industry for the collection of income tax 
from sub-contractors because of the widespread defrauding of the income tax 
system that otherwise occurs. Alternatively this industry could be banned from 
employing MES Workfare people altogether.  
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Another possible fraud would be for an employer to register an employer as MES 
Workfare for the employee's first few months when the employer has every intention 
of keeping the employee permanently. The counter to this, of course, is to charge 
employers a relatively large amount (perhaps the full MES Workfare wage) for the 
initial months' use of the employee where the employee stays after the initial period. 
  
7. MES Workfare jobs are temporary jobs and the latter are not worthwhile. 
 One answer to this is that the average normal job lasts only between two and three 
years, with a substantial proportion lasting a matter of months. Furthermore there is 
a whole industry (temporary employment agencies) devoted to supplying employers 
with labour for a matter of weeks, days and even hours.  
Another point here is that when employment rises under conventional policies, i.e. a 
straight rise in demand, labour turnover rises. Thus the additional jobs created under 
conventional policies are to a significant extent temporary ones.  
 
8. Administrative Costs  
The important question here is the relationship between overall costs and benefits. 
The administration costs of workfare in the U.S. seem to have roughly speaking 
equalled the benefits, in the form of output from workfare people and savings in 
social security payments to those refusing the work (Helms (1983) and Schiller 
(1990».  
However workfare to date in the U.S. has been plagued by argument and muddle at 
least in a majority of states. Where there is a general agreement that it ought to 
work, like in West Virginia, then it works well (see Germanis (1983) p. 78). Moreover 
there are benefits other than the above mentioned to take into account, like the work 
experienced and the 'employee to employer introduction' element, and the output 
from those who decide to get normal jobs rather than do workfare jobs or have their 
benefits reduced.  
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9. The unemployed should not be forced or induced into unsuitable jobs  
A substantial proportion of the unemployed do take jobs unlike· their previous jobs. 
Daniel (1974, p. 103) found that of those finding jobs relatively quickly, 59 per cent 
described the jobs as "very different" from their previous jobs. It could well be argued 
that these people have no obligation to pay taxes to support other individuals who 
are declining to work because they cannot find jobs with which they are acquainted.  
As to just how unsuited MES Workfare people would be to their jobs, this is hard to 
estimate. Certainly some of the vacancies and their occupants would be just the 
same under MES Workfare as under a straight rise in demand without MES 
Workfare. Also to the extent that MES Workfare involved people in unsuitable jobs, 
there would not be the same commercial pressure on such people as in the case of 
normal jobs to which the employees concerned were not suited.  
As for the idea that it is wrong for skilled people to have to do unskilled work for a 
while, this is thoroughly strange in view of the fact that skilled people spend a 
considerable portion of their time doing unskilled work both in the domestic and 
working environment. Brain surgeons dig their gardens during the weekend and help 
their spouses with washing the dishes. As to the working environment, anyone 
employed by a small firm has to 'muck in' and do any and every job that needs 
doing. The employees of small firms are not famous for nervous breakdowns or 
other harm that comes from this.  
The exact extent to which MES Workfare would induce people into unsuitable work 
is intimately tied up with the cause of the rise in unemployment over the last twenty 
years or so. To illustrate, if the cause is an increased specialisation in the labour 
market, perhaps combined with a failure to train people for specialist jobs, then MES 
Workfare would induce people into relatively unsuitable jobs. However there is little 
evidence that the degree of specialisation or standards of training are vastly different 
to twenty years ago.  
In contrast there are at least a couple of explanations for the rise in unemployment 
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which do not imply any increased specialisation. First there is the rise in voluntary 
unemployment dealt with under criticism No 3 above. Secondly it is possible that 
trade union wage claims go through the roof at a higher level of unemployment than 
twenty years ago and that this is the cause of the rise in unemployment. Certainly 
the trade union 'mark up' in the U.K. (that is the additional pay a union member gets 
compared to a similar non-union person) rose from about five per cent in the 1960s 
to about ten per cent in the 1980s, and then declined at the start of the '90s. The 
mark up has thus mirrored changes in unemployment to some extent which is 
evidence (albeit crude evidence) that unions are to some extent the cause of 
unemployment.   
Finally, the only reason Beveridge gave for people not having to do jobs other than 
their normal ones was that this might reduce their chances of getting the latter. This 
was a valid point in the days when physical labour was extremely arduous and half 
the population did not have running hot water: turning up for an interview for a 
clerical job looking like a labourer obviously had disadvantages. But the above no 
longer obtains; physical work is much less arduous now, and everyone has decent 
washing facilities.  
 
10. MES Workfare does not incorporate training  
The word 'workfare' has been used in too broad a sense over the last twenty years in 
the U.S. and has incorporated in some instances pure training and no actual work; in 
others it has involved pure job searching and no work or training.  
So far as the word in the sense used in this paper goes, workfare has nothing 
specifically to do with formal training, as distinct from 'learning by doing' which is an 
inevitable part of any- job, workfare or otherwise. Thus MES Workfare does involve 
some training, namely the learning by doing element.  
Anyone who thinks that learning by doing is somehow inferior to formal training 
should note that there is far from universal agreement on this point amongst those 
actually employing trainees and amongst trainees themselves (see Roberts (1986) 
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Ch. 7). Of course a sizable proportion of what was learned in MES Workfare jobs 
would be wasted because the jobs are temporary, but then there is always a large 
wastage element in training (e.g. see Berthoud (1978)).  
As to formal training, there is a fundamental clash between the basic characteristics 
of a workfare job and the characteristics of any formal training, which clash is as 
follows. The only efficient way to run any formal training involves courses running for 
a specific length of time. This is because unless one has a teacher-to-pupil ratio of 
one-to-one which is exorbitantly expensive, the different pupils on a particular course 
must be taught as a group. Workfare jobs in contrast last for a random length of time. 
Thus no formal training can be tied to a MES Workfare job. Something like evening 
classes which are not tied to the job, are of course quite different.  
In case the above paragraphs give the impression that training is being belittled, this 
is not the intention. Doubtless we need more training, but this thesis is concerned 
primarily with employment. The question as to what training accompanies existing or 
additional employment is a separate issue, and is not an issue on which the author 
claims to be an expert.  
 
11. It is not only the unemployed but also those in employment who would be 
attracted to the relatively easy going and unproductive MES Workfare jobs, 
hence the latter might reduce national output  
This weakness in MES Workfare is a potentially serious one. The only counter to it is 
to keep control of the total number of MES Workfare jobs and keep it in line with the 
number of people induced to come off unemployment benefit as a result of MES 
Workfare.  
This weakness is not of course unique to MES Workfare; it is a characteristic 
common to any attempt to reduce unemployment by creating jobs at the lower end of 
the market. J.C.S.s are an example, as was the entire Russian economy up to 
recently (see final paragraphs). Moreover it cannot be said that creating jobs at the 
lower end of the market is a weakness in MES Workfare or any other measure with 
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this characteristic; the unemployed tend to consist of the less skilled and competent 
members of the workforce. If jobs are to be created for them, they will inevitably tend 
to be those towards the lower end of the market.  
 
12. MES Workfare would not improve the inflation/unemployment trade-off to 
the extent that inflation stems from areas of the economy other than the labour 
market  
The above contains a truth but not a very significant one.  
The factor of production that runs into short supply as full employment (of labour) is 
approached is labour. That may seem a statement of the obvious, but there is 
always an abundant supply of people who have not grasped the point, for example 
advocates of labour supply reduction cures for unemployment - early retirement, job 
sharing, overtime bans, etc. (see Appendix III).  
There are any number of surveys of the proportion of factories and plant working at 
capacity which always produce roughly the same result: about twenty per cent at any 
one time are working at capacity, about twenty per cent are working at about ninety 
per cent capacity, about twenty per cent are working at eighty per cent capacity and 
so on. The proportion that reach capacity when demand rises by say five per cent is 
very small (maybe about five per cent). As to shortages of physical goods, these can 
usually be alleviated by imports.  
Finally there is a vast amount of literature in which it is assumed without question 
that reducing unemployment is essentially a labour market question. Anyone wishing 
to claim that unemployment is to any significant extent caused by plant or equipment 
shortages is not disagreeing with MES Workfare as such but with probably a large 
majority of labour market economists.  
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13. The elasticity of demand for unproductive labour is low thus making labour 
available at little or no charge would not create many vacancies  
The above is a popular sentiment, particularly with those who advocate minimum 
wage laws. It displays an ignorance of elementary economics. The opening pages of 
most basic economics text books make the point that humanity's needs and greed 
are infinite. In other words there is almost no limit to the work that can be found for 
labour if it is free or near free. Indeed the advocates of J.C.S.s never tire of telling us 
that there are an infinite number of socially useful jobs to be done. They are correct.  
There are a number of reasons why the undoubted elasticity of demand for labour as 
it approaches the 'free' level does not translate into vacancies. The main one is that 
supply is also elastic; as the wage drops towards unemployment benefit levels, the 
amount of labour forthcoming falls away dramatically, and employers know it. Thus 
the latter do not bother creating many low paid vacancies under existing employment 
policies. Under MES Workfare, the number of such vacancies would rise.  
As distinct from allocating MES Workfare people to existing employers, there is no 
reason they could not be allocated to keeping old aged pensions' gardens tidy. That 
itself would absorb about half a million unemployed in the U.K. The elasticity of 
demand for the labour is not the problem. The problem is how many of the 
unemployed are capable of turning up at the right place at the right time, and 
whether anything that brings a bead of sweat to their brow is too much for them, and 
whether they are capable of carrying out simple instructions. At a wild guess, the 
proportion of the unemployed in the U.K. capable of the above might be somewhere 
between half and three-quarters.  
 
14. MES Workfare would gain a reputation for including the least productive 
and most troublesome employees, which would induce employers to avoid it 
altogether.  
This is certainly a potential problem, but exactly the same applies to the government 
subsidised employment agencies in the U.K. (Job Centres), that is, employers. 
47 
 
aiming for high quality labour tend to recruit via private employment agencies or 
through advertisements in the press, whereas employers happy with lower quality 
labour tend to go to Job Centres. However this is only a tendency, and is not 
generally held to be a good criticism of Job Centres.  
 
15. MES Workfare people would get used as cheap labour or be put on to 
menial work  
First, the word or notion 'menial' is unquantifiable and thus of no practical use. 
Placing one brick on top of another all day long, that is, bricklaying, is pretty menial 
work (particularly in a winter wind).  
If the above criticism is valid, this presumably means we should stop building 
houses. Collecting the garbage, labouring, lorry driving, train driving and a hundred 
other occupations are not exactly intellectually stimulating. Presumably these 
activities should be banned also.  
Furthermore, there are numerous jobs which are on the face of it far from menial, 
which those concerned cannot stick - for example more school teachers in the U.K. 
are actively seeking alternative employment than members of almost any other 
profession. This presumably makes teaching menial.  
If the word 'menial' means anything at all, one of its chief constituents is the 
monotony of the work involved. This is exactly what MES Workfare would not 
involve, that is it would involve people in more variety than they would otherwise get.  
It is interesting to speculate on why anyone should employ terminology that is for all 
practical purposes devoid of meaning. The answer is probably that they are not 
interested in doing anything of practical use; their main objective is to appear socially 
concerned and caring and this is most easily done by making poorly thought out 
criticisms of existing or proposed economic or social systems (which, like any 
unconstructive criticism, often just makes the system worse). Indeed the main 
purpose of this paper is to put right the effects of a collection of people who at best 
have hearts bigger than their heads and at worse are vociferous and incompetent 
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do-gooders; the instigators of minimum wage rules of one sort or another.  
 
Some Final Remarks· Russia's Workfare  
In July 1991 the Russians announced their intention of introducing unemployment 
benefit equal to half the national average wage. Furthermore the unemployed are to 
be allowed to do a limited number of jobs while still in receipt of their benefit, which 
of course has similarities to MES Workfare. But it remains to be seen how well this is 
administered. Given their other problems, the chances of it being administered with 
any sophistication are minimal at least for a year or two.  
As to the employment system in Russia before the recent dramatic changes 
there, this amounted to workfare on a grand scale. There was no unemployment 
benefit, but a ready availability of low output jobs in the absence of productive 
ones, for those claiming to want work. The mistake under this system (as at least 
one Russian economist, Popov, pointed out (see Binyon (1981)) was that the 
pay for the low output jobs was often as not little different from the high output 
ones. Thus employers with relatively productive jobs on offer frequently could not 
fill the vacancies even though they knew there was suitable labour in the vicinity, 
labour engaged in near fatuous activities. So serious was this problem that 
Popov claimed unemployment was preferable to the 'high wage/unproductive' 
work. This experience will hopefully underline the importance of not offering too 
generous wages for MES Workfare jobs unless government employment agency 
job search efforts are greatly expanded to compensate.  
As an alternative to unemployment, it is interesting to note that Popov advocated 
much the same as the typical workfare advocate. He claimed there are an infinite 
number of 'socially useful' things to be done, like keeping the streets free of litter, 
and that the unemployed be put on to this sort of work.  
To paraphrase Popov with his claim that unemployment is preferable to high 
wage-unproductive work, the claim of this paper is that temporary, subsidised, 
modest wage/unproductive work with existing employers, for all its lack of 
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glamour, would reduce unemployment.  
 
Appendix I: The Irrelevance of Cost per Job  
The idea that cost per job created by a subsidy or J.C.S. is no criterion by which to 
judge it is not new, e.g. see Baily (1978) p. 51, or Wachter (1978) p. 82. However the 
latter and other authors do not pursue the matter at length, thus a more detailed and 
hopefully better argument is set out below.  
The argument is in two halves: the first deals with subsidies that aim to lower the 
price of types of labour in surplus, so that demand can then be raised. The second 
half concentrates on the spurious claim that there is merit in minimising the 
additional demand per job.  
The reason for J.C.S.s low cost per job is thus: employment subsidies and schemes 
can be divided into two categories. First there are those that subsidise all members 
of a particular type of labour, for example all youths. These will be called blanket 
subsidies. Secondly there are those that subsidise just the additional jobs created. 
These will be called marginal subsidies. J.C.S.s belong to the latter group, which 
clearly involves an apparently lower cost per job than the former.  
The fundamental reason why cost per job is irrelevant is that the total cost is made 
up of two or three entirely different types of cost which in no way can be compared to 
each other. Thus the total cost per job is irrelevant. It is the make-up of this total, or 
the type of cost that is of supreme relevance.  
It is generally accepted that there are at least two different types of public 
expenditure cost: first there are resource costs or real costs (for example 
expenditure on the military or on a civil engineering project) and secondly, transfers 
(for example transfers from taxpayers to old aged pensions). But there is a third not 
so widely recognised cost, sometimes called an unreal cost, which consists of 
government expenditure which ends up back in the very same taxpayer/consumers' 
pockets from whence it originated. This occurs when government subsidises 
something consumed by the population at large. To the extent that this expenditure 
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ends up in the form of lower prices for the very same people who paid the tax that 
financed the subsidy, such expenditure is not even a transfer.  
Where the subsidy is implemented for no good reason, a straightforward distortion of 
prices occurs, and methods for calculating the resulting reduction in welfare or 
national income are adequately set out in the text books. Thus the total amount of 
the subsidy can be split into three types of cost. First there is a real cost, that is 
administration costs plus the reduction in national income. Second and third there 
are transfers and unreal costs.  
Returning now to blanket employment subsidies, we are concerned here with 
subsidies of specific underutilised types of labour, the aim of the subsidy being to 
increase employment amongst the type of labour concerned, with, hopefully, little 
decrease in employment elsewhere in the labour market. Unless something is 
seriously wrong somewhere, national income does not decline, it rises. Thus one 
cannot talk of any real or resource cost being involved (apart from administration 
costs).  
As to J.C.S.s, these for reasons spelled out in the main text involve a misallocation 
of real resources as compared to the allocation that pertains when the labour 
concerned is subsidised into employment with existing employers. The public 
expenditure costs on the other hand of blanket subsidies are largely unreal costs. 
That is, assuming the normal competitive processes are working, such expenditure 
(minus administration costs) ends up back in the taxpayer/consumer's pocket. Even 
if the normal competitive processes are not working properly, in other words if some 
of the subsidy leaks to profits, this is still primarily a transfer (from taxpayer to 
employer) and not a resource cost. Furthermore the fact of competitive forces not 
working properly is not a weakness in the blanket subsidy. It is a more general 
problem and will doubtless result in the misallocation of resources that have nothing 
specifically to do with the subsidy.  
The above argument about the largely unreal nature of the costs of blanket subsidies 
is certainly valid if the labour concerned suffers excess unemployment merely 
because it is overpriced, for example because of minimum wage laws in the case of 
youths. In short, if the problem is an incorrect price then the solution, pretty 
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obviously, is to correct the price.  
But, of course, an artificially high price is not necessarily the explanation or the whole 
explanation for the unemployment concerned, for example unemployment amongst 
youths is certainly on the high side to some extent because of youths' tendency to 
quit their jobs voluntarily more often than other groups. This, however, is no 
compensation for J.C.S.s. In other words the fact of an employment subsidy not 
being a cure for a particular type or cause of unemployment is no proof that a J.C.S. 
is a cure, for example it is very hard to see how a J.C.S. can get at the above 
mentioned tendency of youths to quit their jobs.  
The conclusion is that the misallocation of resources caused by J.C.S.s involves 
resource costs, whereas while the public expenditure costs per job of blanket 
subsidies are higher than for J.C.S.s the former involve largely unreal costs. Thus 
the relatively low cost per job of  J.C.S. is no merit.  
Some readers may be worried that the above argument implies a vast expenditure 
on employment subsidies. One answer to this is that the sole purpose of blanket 
subsidies is to alter the relative price of different types of labour. This can be 
achieved as much by an employment tax as an employment subsidy, or by a 
combination of the two, that is taking the type of labour that is too cheap and 
subsidising the type that is too expensive (see Jackman (1986) for an example of 
this). Indeed for those who insist on claiming that subsidies leak to profits, a 
tax/subsidy regime is the answer, since this cannot involve any net leakage to 
profits.  
 
Additional demand per job.  
We now turn to a quite different and spurious cost per job argument which is 
concerned solely with net additions to aggregate demand. The argument is that 
increasing public expenditure creates more jobs than the equivalent amount of tax 
cut. Hence, so it is argued, the former is better value for money than the latter, or 
creates more jobs for a given impact on inflation than the latter. This is sometimes 
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cited in favour of J.C.S.s since these involve public expenditure rather than tax cuts. 
For example Richard Layard in an otherwise very informative and well worth reading 
study of unemployment uses this argument (Layard (1986) p. 90). For another 
example see Metcalf (1982). The basic flaw in this argument is that while some 
factors that influence demand per job are of relevance, others are definitely not, 
hence demand per job as such is not relevant. The fallacious demand per job 
arguments are as follows:  
1. Raising demand does not involve any sort of resource cost: it merely involves 
printing more money and making book-keeping entries at banks. In the words of 
Armstrong (1978) p. 278, "Exchequer costs are illusory". Thus these costs cannot be 
compared to, or set against, the real benefits or real output from various forms of 
employment as Layard does. To illustrate with Layard's figures, Layard argues that 
the Exchequer cost of a J.C.S. job is £2,000 per annum, whereas the equivalent cost 
of a job brought about by tax cuts is £40,000 a year. Hence, so he argues, unless 
output from the tax cut job is more than 40,000/2,000 times more than the J.C.S. job, 
the latter will be better value for money. The fallacy here is that the real cost of the 
£2,000 is nothing at all, and the same goes for the £40,000. Thus the only relevant 
question is whether the tax cut job involves greater net product than the J.C.S. job 
and there are strong reasons set out earlier for thinking it does.  
2. The main reason for the relatively large increase in demand per job required by 
the private sector is simply that the private sector sells its output whereas the public 
sector gives away its output for the most part. The extra demand is required by the 
private sector. To this extent, there is no reason why the additional demand a private 
sector job entails will cause any additional inflation.  
3. Another argument sometimes produced by the 'low demand per job' enthusiasts is 
that the large demand required by a private sector job somehow seeps into the rest 
of the economy and causes inflation there. The answer to this is that if it did, it would 
cause additional employment there which means that the original demand per job 
calculation is wrong, which is a self contradiction.  
4. It is not demand in isolation that causes inflation. It is the relationship between 
aggregate demand and aggregate supply that counts; to be more precise, it is the 
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spare capacity in the ultimate source of all supply, the labour market, that really 
counts. Inflation takes off when labour market spare capacity becomes inadequate. 
Whether this inadequacy comes about as a result of increased demand or not is 
irrelevant. Layard himself quite correctly makes this point in his Chapter 12 in which 
he argues against labour supply reduction cures for unemployment (early retirement, 
job sharing, job splitting, emigration, etc.).  
In short, removing people from the dole queues and into work with little increase in 
demand is no great achievement, it can be done with no increase in demand at all in 
the case of early retirement, but this is no merit in the latter.  
5. Another point sometimes raised by the low demand per job enthusiasts (which in 
effect is probably just a variation on some of the above arguments) is that the 
multiplier effects of some forms of employment creation are low relative to others. 
The answer to this is that a low multiplier is no demerit; it can be countered by in 
effect printing more money, and that costs nothing.  
6. The above points themselves destroy one final argument put by the demand per 
job enthusiasts, namely the inflationary expectations argument. The argument is that 
if demand per job is kept down, people will not expect inflation, hence the latter will 
be ameliorated. The answer to this is that if the above five points are rational and 
people's inflationary expectations are rationally based, then demand per job will be 
irrelevant for them. For example, if government announced it was going to remove 
people from the dole queues and into jobs by means of early retirement, this would 
involve no increase in demand per person removed from the dole queues; but if the 
'inflation expectors' behaved rationally they might well be right to expect inflation.  
Having criticised some demand per job arguments, it is worth repeating that other 
demand per job arguments are valid. For example the unemployed tend to consist of 
the less productive members of the workforce, thus any measure to provide work for 
them will involve a relatively small increase in demand per job. But the fact remains 
that demand per job as such is irrelevant. As an illustration of this irrelevance, the 
main measure advocated in this thesis, MES Workfare, has a relatively low demand 
per job for the above reason. Also its cost per job in the sense used in the first half of 
the appendix is low because it is a marginal rather than blanket subsidy. On the 
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other hand the measure advocated near the outset for dealing with youth 
unemployment was a blanket subsidy, which involves a relatively high cost per 
job. There is no contradiction here: there are solid arguments behind both 
measures.  
Finally, having criticised one small part of Layard's work, readers not already 
acquainted with his work are advised that if they want to read something 
worthwhile on unemployment, they cannot do much better than read Layard's 
works.  
 
Appendix II: Weaknesses in some criticisms of job creation schemes  
This appendix concentrates primarily on J T Addison's 1979 paper entitled 'Does 
Job Creation Work?'. This is one of a collection of papers in a book entitled 'Job 
Creation - or Destruction?'  
The first weakness in this paper is its definition of the phrase job creation. The 
phrase is used to start with simply as a synonym for 'employment subsidy'. 
There is in fact no sharp dividing line between J.C.S.s as defined earlier in the 
main text of this present paper and employment subsidies: a J.C.S. is simply an 
employer who is in receipt of a subsidy that is so large or is structured so that the 
employer can pay little attention to the usual requirement placed on employers 
namely that they minimise numbers employed.  
The first two sections of Addison's paper deal with employment subsidies pure 
and simple. The third section is entitled 'Public Sector Job Creation'. There is no 
indication as to whether he has in mind subsidies for the public sector operating 
alongside similar subsidies for the private sector, or whether he has in mind the 
concentrating of subsidies in the public sector or parts of it thus turning the latter 
into something similar to J.C.S.s as defined at the outset of this present paper. 
However, we shall assume he means the former to start with, and then the latter 
and demonstrate that his arguments are about equally invalid in both cases. His 
third section makes three points. The first is that some efforts to subsidise types 
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of labour in surplus have failed because the subsidies have been diverted to the 
employment of normal labour. The answer to this is that numerous examples of 
the above type of subsidy have succeeded in their aim; in other words the fact that 
one or two attempts at administering something have involved incompetence 
does not prove that all present or future attempts will also involve incompetence. 
If of course there is some fundamental theoretical reason for thinking the above 
sort of subsidy can never be efficiently administered, then we need to be told 
what this is.  
Point number two attacks the short term nature of the jobs created. The answer 
to this is given under 'criticism No 7' in the main text. Addison then points to the 
contrast between the relatively high skill content of public sector jobs vis-a-vis 
the relatively large amount of unskilled labour amongst the unemployed. The 
answer to this is that as long as the marginal product of unskilled labour with an 
employer is positive, there is scope for subsidising the labour into work with the 
employer. Indeed the logical extension of Addison's argument would seem to be 
that since the unemployed are invariably relatively unskilled compared to the 
employed workforce even in 1930s type depressions, unemployment can never 
be reduced even if it is at 1930s levels - a patent absurdity.  
Under this third point Addison also claims that "As a general rule, although some 
managers in the public sector will have an incentive to produce efficiently, even 
here more factor inputs (workers) will be employed than are required on profit 
maximising grounds". The fallacy in this point is that it is a general weakness in 
the public sector, not a weakness in employment subsidies or J.C.S.s as such. It 
is moreover not a very good argument against the public sector: the electorate in 
most countries is happy to see the public sector constitute up to half their 
economies despite being well aware of the above weakness.  
Let us now assume that Addison has in mind concentrating employment 
subsidies in the public sector, that is that he has in mind something nearer 
J.C.S.s as defined near the outset of this present paper.  
Point No 1. The answer is the same. One instance of administrative incompetence 
does not prove all other instances present or future are or will be incompetent.  
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Point No 2. Addison's criticism is valid here. In other words it is not desirable to 
concentrate short term jobs on one sector of the economy for reasons given in the 
main text.  
Point No 3. Addison's points are again invalid for reasons given above.  
Finally, lest the reader gets the impression that works by J T Addison are not 
worth reading, this is far from the case. The sole purpose of this appendix is to 
illustrate that criticisms of' J.C.S.s to date seem to be a long way short of 
competent for some strange reason. There is no question but that had Addison 
really tried, he has the ability to put some much better arguments than the 
above.  
Apart from Addison's contribution to 'Job Creation - or Destruction?', there were 
four other contributors. None of the arguments they deploy exactly leave J.C.S.s 
reeling.  
Another attack was made on J.C.S.s by Milton Friedman (1976). This simply 
made the claim that money spent on a J.C.S. is money not spent elsewhere, so 
jobs created by a J.C.S. are jobs destroyed elsewhere. This of course is an over-
simplification. However the article concerned was in Newsweek, not a 
publication in which one would expect any economist to produce his most 
sophisticated arguments.  
 
Appendix III: The flaw in traditional marginal employment subsidies.   
Subsidies can be divided in to two types. First there are marginal subsidies which 
subsidise or aim to subsidise just the additional units produced as a result of the 
subsidy. Second there are what are sometimes called “intra-marginal” or “average” 
subsidies. The latter type of subsidy subsidises all members of the target group, e.g. 
all youths or every employee in the country or all cabbages. 
Marginal subsidy proposals have been around for a long time and probably the most 
popular (which will be called a “traditional marginal subsidy” (TMS)) is the idea that 
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each firm should be rewarded in proportion to the expansion in its workforce 
compared to some starting date.  
With a view to illustrating the flaw in this idea, let us assume that people hired as a 
result of TMS are hired fairly quickly after its introduction, say within a month (and 
same goes for MES Workfare). 
Ironically, there would be no difference between MES Workfare and TMS for the 
initial month or so. That is, employers would react (as pointed out above) by hiring 
whichever members of the dole queue they thought were most suitable. Let’s say 
employers are induced to employ X% of the unemployed.  
Put another way, any system which compensates employers for the unsuitability of 
this X% at any particular point in time will result in a reduction in the natural level 
of unemployment. But there is a problem. The actual set of people making up the 
two groups “perfectly employable and not requiring a subsidy” and “unsuitable and 
thus requiring a subsidy” are constantly changing. That is, employers constantly lose 
staff through retirement, voluntary quits and so on. And apart from that, employers’ 
labour and skill requirements are constantly changing. 
Thus a few months after TMS starts, employers will be looking for an assortment of 
different types of labour to replace those who have retired, quit or fallen ill (in exactly 
the same way as they were doing before the subsidy started). 
 
But the big difference between the initial week or month of the subsidy and the 
situation a few months down the road is that in the former case the employees taken 
on were all relatively unsuitable, and employers were compensated for this 
unsuitability. In contrast, a few months down the road, employers do not just require 
relatively unsuitable labour: they require all types of labour, including the highly 
skilled and the "very suitable" (who have retired, quit voluntarily, etc).  And these 
latter types of labour just aren’t there in the dole queue in sufficient numbers. 
(Remember the natural level of unemployment: there is a minimum feasible amount 
of unemployment for a given level of demand). 
 
The latter point can be put another way. On implementing the subsidy, it is obvious 
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to employers (and everyone else come to that) which employees are being 
subsidised. In contrast, a few months later, the subsidy simply becomes a monthly 
cheque that comes from government which is not obviously applicable to any 
particular set of employees. Most importantly, the subsidy is not even necessarily 
applicable to the employees who were initially taken on as a result of the subsidy 
because not all of them will still be unsuitable. For example, some will have gained 
firm specific skills and will have become perfectly viable without the subsidy. In 
addition, most employer’s labour requirements will have changed over the months, 
and some employees who were perfectly suited to their work are allocated to 
different jobs within their firm, jobs to which they are not so suited. Some of these 
latter employees in the absence of the subsidy and rise in demand would have lost 
their jobs and would have been available to help other employers fill vacancies. 
Unfortunately they are not available. 
 
Conclusion: a few months after implementing TMS, its modus operandum 
evaporates. 
 
Appendix IV. Fiat money and Chartalism. 
This paper started by considering government as employer of last resort (ELR) and 
then argued towards something which is hopefully more sophisticated. It is thus of 
relevance to mention another theory in connection with ELR. This theory has a long 
history and is currently being promoted mainly by L.Randall Wray. References to the 
latter’s publications will not be given because they are numerous, and these works 
are easily obtainable by entering relevant terms in a search engine (e.g. “Randall 
Wray”, “fiat money” “employer of last resort”). Also the works which criticise the “fiat 
money / Chartalism” idea are easily available this way. 
The basic idea of Chartalism is that fiat money derives its value not so much from  
the factors set out in economics text books, but from the fact that governments are 
the issuers of the money, and secondly the fact that citizens need this money to pay 
taxes. The idea is normally illustrated by references to economies where some form 
of fairly dictatorial government issues money and demands taxes and can reap 
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various advantages for itself from this arrangement. 
These alleged characteristics of fiat money, so the argument goes, give government 
the ability to create large numbers of last resort public sector jobs. There are a huge 
number of weaknesses and flaws in this argument, as follows. 
1.  Clearly in dictatorial regimes a government which issues currency and collects tax 
can reap rewards for itself: such a government is simply exploiting monopoly powers. 
Such a government also has powers to set up ELR schemes and force or induce the 
unemployed to do this sort of work – powers not available in democracies.  
However in democracies there are limits to the monopoly powers that governments 
can exploit. For example state schools and hospitals are effectively in competition 
with their private alternatives. If the former do not produce reasonable value for 
money, relative to the latter, the government gets booted out at the next election. Or 
citizens campaign for the removal of offending bureaucrats or politicians. (In the UK, 
state schools gain more “pupil qualifications” per £ than private sector schools. Thus 
state schools perform very satisfactorily on average. Private schools ARE higher 
standard, but this is only achieved by “throwing money at the problem.”) 
In short, governments in a democracy are little more than glorified conglomerates, 
which have to produce reasonable value for money. The fact that payment by 
citizens to governments is called “tax” is irrelevant. One could equally well call the 
payment that people make to other large conglomerates, e.g. supermarkets, a “tax”. 
2. In extremis, food and shelter takes priority over taxes. That is people are far more 
in “need” of money for the purpose of buying food and obtaining shelter than for the 
purposes of paying taxes. Indeed, people do not even need to go hungry before they 
start refusing to pay taxes.  The refusal of large numbers of people in the UK to pay 
the “poll tax” in the 1980s was an example. Many of these people were not 
desperate for food or shelter: doubtless half of them consumed beer and cigarettes, 
and owned cars. 
3. While governments do have a monopoly on the issue of base money, this is near 
irrelevant: between around 2000 and the peak of the boom just before the credit 
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crunch of 2008/9, commercial banks created so much money that the monetary base 
became almost irrelevant. 
Another point which suggests that governments are of limited importance to the 
whole fiat money question is the fact that the UK was off the gold standard (i.e. it had 
a fiat currency) for longish periods between World War I and 1946 when the Bank of 
England was nationalised. I.e. the UK’s fiat currency in this period was administered 
by a private bank, not by government. 
Against that, it should be mentioned that a fiat currency, to a much greater extent 
than money which consists of a rare metal (or is backed by a rare metal) depends 
crucially on the rule of law. And it is governments which create and enforce laws.  
Put another way, gold forms a good currency in a relatively lawless society where for 
example anyone with a printing press can print fiat currency, or open a bank and run 
it in a fraudulent manner. But while in practice every government plays a large role in 
organising its fiat currency, a system where government just framed and enforced 
the laws, but privately owned banks administered all aspects of the fiat currency 
would be perfectly feasible: approximately the arrangement in the UK between the 
two world wars as mentioned above. 
4. The claim that control of the monetary base enables governments to set up ELR 
schemes is nonsense. As will be clear from the rest of this paper, there is no big 
budgetary problem in setting up ELR systems. This is first because in most 
developed countries the unemployed get some form of payment anyway: 
unemployment benefit. A public sector ELR system in which those concerned just 
received more or less what they would have received in benefits with no expenditure 
on skilled permanent employees to run the system, or materials or capital equipment 
would be highly inefficient.  That is, additional sums would be needed to attract 
skilled permanent labour, materials, and capital equipment away from the existing 
economy. But this is not a big problem. The relevant sums can come from tax. 
5. The whole “fiat money / ELR” idea seems to be getting nowhere. There do not 
seem to be any papers in leading economics journals on the subject. 
6. The claim that citizens need “the government’s money” with which to pay taxes is 
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certainly not true in the UK, which has a perfectly viable fiat currency. Citizens can 
pay taxes with anything they like:  houses, lumps of gold or antique furniture. This 
method of paying taxes is extremely unusual because of the sheer inconvenience, 
but it happens from time to time. (The UK tax authorities fall over themselves to be 
flexible if it facilitates relieving citizens of their worldly wealth!) 
The above “barter” point could be answered by saying that the tax authorities are 
bound to convert the above sort of physical commodities into fiat currency upon 
receiving them, and hence that the tax is effectively being paid in the fiat currency. 
But this latter argument is invalid: the important point is that the tax liability is 
extinguished by giving the physical commodity to the tax authorities. Period. End of 
story. 
Of course the tax authority will almost certainly convert the physical commodity into 
the fiat currency, but if the tax authority was operating in a country with some other 
form of currency it would do exactly the same: that is convert the physical commodity 
into the dominant currency in the country concerned. Thus this conversion has 
nothing to do with fiat money as such.  
7. Any idea that because governments issue base money and collect tax that 
therefore they can print money willy nilly or let demand go through the roof so as to 
help them set up ELR systems is plain nonsense. Indeed, advocates of Cartalism 
seem to start their works with eloquent displays of concern about unemployed 
resources, labour in particular. They then tend to claim that Chartalism facilitates 
additional spending. However they are normally very quiet on why or to what extent 
the generally accepted sources in inflation (skilled labour shortages) have been 
moderated. 
8. Chartalists often claim that it can bring price stability if the wage of ERL people is 
fixed, and all other prices are allowed to adjust themselves relative to this price. But 
it would be possible to do exactly the same with any other commodity. For example it 
would be possible to control inflation by concentrating solely on the price of 
cabbages. If the price of cabbages rose, demand could be curtailed or reduced until 
the price of cabbages declined to its target level. Exactly what is achieved by this 
strange form of inflation control is a mystery. 
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